	Number	Percentage
Medical department	3,609	18.30
Dental department	1,089	5.53
Engineering department	881	4.47
Pharmaceutical department	872	4.42
Homeopathic department	379	1.92
Honorary degrees	163	.83
Total	19,714	100.00

ELECTIONS—VOTE OF IDIOT OR INSANE PERSON—ASCERTAINING HOW HE VOTED.—The court of appeals of Kentucky had before it an interesting question in the recent case of *Edwards* v. *Logan* (1902), — Ky. —, 70 S. W. Rep. 852, growing out of an election contest. Appellant and appellee were rival candidates for a county office. On the face of the returns, appellant had a small plurality, and received the certificate of election. Appellee instituted proceedings to contest the election, and the circuit court deducted, for various reasons, enough votes from appellant's list to give the election to the appellee, and the former appealed. Among the votes deducted from appellant's list was one cast by a person "who is conclusively shown to have been an idiot." There was no means of identifying his ballot. The trial court, however, assumed that he had voted for appellant, for two reasons: *First*, evidence was offered that the idiot claimed to belong to the same political party as appellant. *Secondly*, evidence was offered that, after the election, the idiot had said that he had voted the straight ticket of that party. It further appeared, however, that the idiot, in stating that he had voted that ticket, proceeded to show how he had marked his ticket, and, in doing so, showed conclusively that if he did so mark his ticket, he voted the straight ticket of the opposite party. The court of appeals held that what the voter subsequently says as to how he voted is at best but hearsay, citing *Tunks* v. *Vincent*, — Ky. —, 51 S. W. Rep. 622; that here he was an idiot, whose testimony would not be received upon a trial, and, *a fortiori*, his statement out of court could be of no avail; that what he said as to the ticket he voted was neutralized by his inconsistent statement of the manner of voting it; and that, therefore, there was no sufficient ground for finding that he had voted for appellant. The court below consequently erred in deducting his vote from appellant's list.

Another person who voted, and whose vote the lower court deducted from appellant's list, was alleged to have been insane upon the day of the election. There was testimony of witnesses, some of whom believed the voter sane, and some believed him insane. There was evidence that there was insanity in the family, and that the voter, his father and his brother had at different times been confined in asylums for the insane, though all had been discharged prior to the date of the election. On the day following the election, this voter was adjudged insane and directed to be confined in an asylum, though the evidence did not clearly show when his malady had reappeared. There was no evidence as to how he voted, but there was evidence that he had always claimed to belong to the party to which appellant belonged. Upon this ground the court below assumed that he must have voted for appellant. The

court of appeals held that from this fact alone, no conclusive presumption to that effect could be drawn. If he were insane—and it was upon this hypothesis that his vote had been deducted from appellant's list—"it is as probable that he voted against as for his party affiliation; at least there is no reasonable probability that could be ascribed to his secret conduct when in such deranged condition, because of his judgment and opinions entertained when in a rational and sane state of mind." His vote was therefore improperly deducted from appellant's list.

"MEANDER LINES"—WHEN THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BOUNDARIES, RATHER THAN THE WATER LINE.—In *Security Land & Exploration Co.* v. *Burns* (Minn. 1902), 91 N. W. 304, the plaintiff in ejectment sought to recover a large amount of heavily timbered land lying between its fractional lot and a lake, claiming that, as successor in title to earlier patentees, its lots should front on the water, because by the government plat they were shown to abut on it, that in that direction the lots should have but one boundary, the lake itself, and that the "meander line" should not be considered a boundary line. The field notes of the government surveyor, from which the official plat was made, indicated the existence of a lake of about 1,800 acres, whereas in fact the lake is, and was when the supposed survey was made, a body of water not over 800 acres in area; between the actual lake and its "meander line," as shown on the plat, there were, and are, 1,000 acres of high land—never a part of the lake—"timbered with trees of more than a century's growth." The court held that the boundaries of fractional lots should not be indefinitely extended, where they appear by the government plat to abut on a body of water which in fact has never existed at substantially the place indicated on the plat, but that in such a case, the meander line must be regarded as the boundary. The judgment for defendants in the court below was affirmed.

This decision and such as *Schlosser* v. *Hemphill* (Iowa 1902), 90 N. W. 842; *McBride* v. *Whitaker* (Nebr. 1902), 90 N. W. 966; *Live Stock Co.* v. *Springer*, 35 Ore. 312, 58 Pac. 102, *Live Stock Co.* v. *Springer*, 185 U. S. 47, indicate that litigation involving the question as to how far the meander line should be taken as a boundary, is not likely to cease soon, in spite of the well recognized general rule that it shall not be so taken (*Railroad* v. *Schumeier*, 7 Wall. 272; *Hardin* v. *Jordan*, 140 U. S. 371), for not only is it evident that many government surveyors have been grossly negligent, but it seems impossible to lay down a rule that will determine, for all cases, how near the meander line must approach the body of water supposedly surveyed in order that the general rule may be applied.

Where a meander line is honestly and fairly drawn, after an actual, and not a fictitious, survey, the plat will represent, with substantial accuracy, the contour of the body of water, and the true quantity of the upland between the meander line and the water line will, on the whole, approximately appear. The settled general rule that the water line, and not the meander line, shall be taken as the boundary, is therefore reasonable. *Sizor* v. *Logansport*, 151 Ind., 626, 44 L. R. A. 814; *Albany Bridge Co.* v. *The People*, 187 Ill., 199.

The application of this rule, it is true, produces, in particular cases, somewhat peculiar results; as, for example, where a small fractional lot of 4½